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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal "presents a conflict between one of society's 
most cherished rights -- freedom of expression-- and one 
of the government's most profound obligations -- the 
protection of minors." American Booksellers v. Webb, 919 
F.2d 1493, 1495 (11th Cir. 1990). The government 
challenges the District Court's issuance of a preliminary 
injunction which prevents the enforcement of the Child 
Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 
(1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. S 231) ("COPA"), enacted in 
October of 1998. At issue is COPA's constitutionality, a 
statute designed to protect minors from "harmful material" 
measured by "contemporary community standards" 
knowingly posted on the World Wide Web ("Web") for 
commercial purposes.1 
 
We will affirm the District Court's grant of a preliminary 
injunction because we are confident that the ACLU's attack 
on COPA's constitutionality is likely to succeed on the 
merits. Because material posted on the Web is accessible 
by all Internet users worldwide, and because current 
technology does not permit a Web publisher to restrict 
access to its site based on the geographic locale of each 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 
the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.S 1331. This court 
exercises appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1), which 
provides a court of appeals with jurisdiction over appeals from 
"[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . 
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions . . . 
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 
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particular Internet user, COPA essentially requires that 
every Web publisher subject to the statute abide by the 
most restrictive and conservative state's community 
standards in order to avoid criminal liability. Thus, because 
the standard by which COPA gauges whether material is 
"harmful to minors" is based on identifying"contemporary 
community standards" the inability of Web publishers to 
restrict access to their Web sites based on the geographic 
locale of the site visitor, in and of itself, imposes an 
impermissible burden on constitutionally protected First 
Amendment speech. 
 
In affirming the District Court, we are forced to recognize 
that, at present, due to technological limitations, there may 
be no other means by which harmful material on the Web 
may be constitutionally restricted, although, in light of 
rapidly developing technological advances, what may now 
be impossible to regulate constitutionally may, in the not- 
too-distant future, become feasible. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
COPA was enacted into law on October 21, 1998. 
Commercial Web publishers subject to the statute that 
distribute material that is harmful to minors are required 
under COPA to ensure that minors do not access the 
harmful material on their Web site. COPA is Congress's 
second attempt to regulate the dissemination to minors of 
indecent material on the Web/Internet. The Supreme Court 
had earlier, on First Amendment grounds, struck down 
Congress's first endeavor, the Communications Decency 
Act, ("CDA") which it passed as part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.2See ACLU v. Reno, 521 
U.S. 844 (1997) ("Reno II"). To best understand the current 
challenge to COPA, it is necessary for us to briefly examine 
the CDA. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. For ease of reference the various applicable cases will be referred to 
as 
follows: ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), hereinafter 
"Reno I" (addressing CDA); ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), 
hereinafter "Reno II" (striking down the CDA as unconstitutional); ACLU 
v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999), hereinafter "Reno III" (case 
currently on appeal addressing constitutionality of COPA). 
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A. CDA 
 
The CDA prohibited Internet users from using the 
Internet to communicate material that, under contemporary 
community standards, would be deemed patently offensive 
to minors under the age of eighteen. See Reno II , 521 U.S. 
at 859-60.3 In so restricting Internet users, the CDA 
provided two affirmative defenses to prosecution; (1) the use 
of a credit card or other age verification system, and (2) any 
good faith effort to restrict access by minors. See id. at 860. 
In holding that the CDA violated the First Amendment, the 
Supreme Court explained that without defining key terms 
the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, the 
Court noted that the breadth of the CDA was "wholly 
unprecedented" in that, for example, it was "not limited to 
commercial speech or commercial entities . . . [but rather] 
[i]ts open-ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities 
and individuals posting indecent messages or displaying 
them on their own computers." Id at 877. 
 
Further, the Court explained that, as applied to the 
Internet, a community standards criterion would effectively 
mean that because all Internet communication is made 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.S 223(d) provides that: 
 
Whoever -- 
 
"(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly -- 
 
"(A) uses an interactive computer service to send a specific person or 
persons under 18 years of age, or 
 
"(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner 
available to a person under 18 years of age, "any comment, request, 
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, 
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or 
organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or 
initiated the communication; or 
 
"(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such 
person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) 
with the intent that it be used for such activity 
 
"shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both." 
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available to a worldwide audience, the content of the 
conveyed message will be judged by the standards of the 
community most likely to be offended by the content. See 
id. at 877-78. Finally, with respect to the affirmative 
defenses authorized by the CDA, the Court concluded that 
such defenses would not be economically feasible for most 
noncommercial Web publishers, and that even with respect 
to commercial publishers, the technology had yet to be 
proven effective in shielding minors from harmful material. 
See id. at 881. As a result, the Court held that the CDA 
was not tailored so narrowly as to achieve the government's 
compelling interest in protecting minors, and that it lacked 
the precision that the First Amendment requires when a 
statute regulates the content of speech. See id . at 874. See 
also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 
2000 WL 646196 (U.S. May 22, 2000). 
 
B. COPA 
 
COPA, the present statute, attempts to "address[ ] the 
specific concerns raised by the Supreme Court" in 
invalidating the CDA. H.R. REP. NO . 105-775 at 12 (1998); 
See S.R. REP. NO. 105-225, at 2 (1998). COPA prohibits an 
individual or entity from: 
 
       knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the 
       material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of 
       the World Wide Web, mak[ing] any communication for 
       commercial purposes that is available to any minor and 
       that includes any material that is harmful to minors. 
 
47 U.S.C. S 231(a)(1) (emphasis added). As part of its 
attempt to cure the constitutional defects found in the 
CDA, Congress sought to define most of COPA's key terms. 
COPA attempts, for example, to restrict its scope to 
material on the Web rather than on the Internet as a whole;4 
to target only those Web communications made for 
"commercial purposes";5 and to limit its scope to only that 
material deemed "harmful to minors." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. COPA defines the clause "by means of the World Wide Web" as the 
"placement of material in a computer server-basedfile archive so that it 
is publicly accessible, over the Internet, using hypertext transfer 
protocol 
or any successor protocol." 47 U.S.C. S 231(e)(1). 
5. COPA defines the clause "commercial purposes" as those individuals 
or entities that are "engaged in the business of making such 
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Under COPA, whether material published on the Web is 
"harmful to minors" is governed by a three-part test, each 
of which must be found before liability can attach: 6 
 
       (A) the average person, applying contemporary 
       community standards, would find, taking the material 
       as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to 
       appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient 
       interest; 
 
       (B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner 
       patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or 
       simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or 
       simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd 
       exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female 
       breast; and 
 
       (C) taken as a whole, lacks serious, literary, art istic, 
       political, or scientific value for minors. 
 
47 U.S.C. S 231(e)(6) (emphasis added).7 The parties 
conceded at oral argument that this "contemporary 
community standards" test applies to those communities 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
communications." 47 U.S.C. S 231(e)(2)(A). In turn, COPA defines a 
person "engaged in the business" as one 
 
       who makes a communication, or offers to make a communication, 
       by means of the World Wide Web, that includes any material that is 
       harmful to minors, devotes time, attention, or labor to such 
       activities, as a regular course of such person's trade or business, 
       with the objective of earning a profit as a result of such 
activities 
       (although it is not necessary that the person make a profit or that 
       the making or offering to make such communications be the 
       person's sole or principal business or source of income). 
 
       Id. S 231(e)(2)(B). 
 
6. In the House Report that accompanied the bill that eventually became 
COPA, this "harmful to minors" test attempts to conform to the 
standards identified by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U.S. 629 (1968), as modified by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) 
in identifying "patently offensive" material.See H.R. REP. NO. 105-775, at 
13 (1998). 
 
7. Under COPA, a minor is defined as one under age seventeen. See 47 
U.S.C. S 231(e)(7). 
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within the United States, and not to foreign communities. 
Therefore, the more liberal community standards of 
Amsterdam or the more restrictive community standards of 
Tehran would not impact upon the analysis of whether 
material is "harmful to minors" under COPA. 
 
COPA also provides Web publishers subject to the statute 
with affirmative defenses. If a Web publisher"has restricted 
access by minors to material that is harmful to minors" 
through the use of a "credit card, debit account, adult 
access code, or adult personal identification number . . . a 
digital certificate that verifies age . . . or by any other 
reasonable measures that are feasible under available 
technology," then no liability will attach to the Web 
publisher even if a minor should nevertheless gain access 
to restricted material under COPA. 47 U.S.C. S 231(c)(1).8 
COPA violators face both criminal (maximum fines of 
$50,000 and a maximum prison term of six months, or 
both) and civil (fines of up to $50,000 for each day of 
violation) penalties.9 
 
C. Overview of the Internet and the World Wide Web 
 
In recent years use of the Internet and the Web has 
become increasingly common in mainstream society. 
Nevertheless, because the unique character of these new 
electronic media significantly affect our opinion today, we 
briefly review their relevant elements.10 
 
The Internet is a decentralized, self-maintained 
networking system that links computers and computer 
networks around the world, and is capable of quickly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The defense also applies if an individual or entity attempts "in good 
faith to implement a defense" listed above. See id. 47 U.S.C. S 231(c)(2). 
 
9. An individual found to have intentionally violated COPA also faces an 
additional fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of violation. See 
47 U.S.C. S 231(a)(2). 
 
10. For more thorough descriptions of the Internet and the Web see e.g., 
Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-45; Reno II , 521 U.S. 844; American 
Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 164-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); 
Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1999 WL 97097 *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) 
(citing cases). 
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transmitting communications. See American Libraries Ass'n 
v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); ACLU v. 
Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("Reno III"). 
Even though the Internet appears to be a "single, integrated 
system" from a user's perspective, in fact no single 
organization or entity controls the Internet. ACLU v. Reno, 
929 F. Supp. 824, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("Reno I"); Reno III, 
31 F. Supp.2d at 484. As a result, there is no "centralized 
point from which individual Web sites or services can be 
blocked from the Web." Id. Although estimates are difficult 
because of the Internet's rapid growth, it was recently 
estimated that the Internet connects over 159 countries 
and more than 109 million users. See ACLU v. Johnson, 
194 F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 
The World Wide Web is a publishing forum consisting of 
millions of individual "Web sites" each containing 
information such as text, images, illustrations, video, 
animation or sounds provided by that site's creator. See 
American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 166. Some of these 
Web sites contain sexually explicit material. See Reno III, 31 
F. Supp.2d at 484. As a publishing forum, the Web is the 
best known method of communicating information online. 
See id. Information is said to be published on the Web as 
soon as it is made available to others by connecting the 
publisher's computer to the Internet. See Reno I , 929 F. 
Supp. at 844; Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 483. Each site is 
connected to the Internet by means of certain protocols that 
permit "the information to become part of a single body of 
knowledge accessible by all Web visitors." American 
Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 166; Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 
483.11 As a part of this unified body of knowledge, Web 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. A user who wishes to access the Web resources employs a "browser." 
Browser software -- such as Netscape Navigator, Mosaic, or Internet 
Explorer -- enables the user to display, print, and download documents 
that are formatted in the standard Web formatting language. See 
American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 166. The Web"uses a `hypertext' 
formatting language called hypertext markup language (HTML), and 
programs that `browse' the Web can display HTML documents containing 
text, images, sound, animation and moving video stored in many other 
formats. . . . [Hyperlinks] allow information to be accessed and organized 
in very flexible ways, and allow individuals to locate and efficiently 
view 
related information even if the information is stored on numerous 
computers all around the world." Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 483. 
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pages are all linked together so that the Internet user can 
freely move from one Web page to another by "clicking" on 
a "link." See id. Because the Internet has an "international, 
geographically-borderless nature,"12  with the proper 
software every Web site is accessible to all other Internet 
users worldwide. See American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 
166; Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 837; Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d 
at 483-84. Indeed, the Internet "negates geometry. . . it is 
fundamentally and profoundly anti-spatial. You cannot say 
where it is or describe its memorable shape and 
proportions or tell a stranger how to get there. But you can 
find things in it without knowing where they are. The 
[Internet] is ambient -- nowhere in particular and 
everywhere at once." Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 956 (Ariz. 
1998). 
 
It is essential to note that under current technology, Web 
publishers cannot "prevent [their site's] content from 
entering any geographic community." Reno III , 31 F. Supp. 
2d at 484. As such, Web publishers cannot prevent Internet 
users in certain geographic locales from accessing their 
site; and in fact the Web publisher will not even know the 
geographic location of visitors to its site. See American 
Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 171. Similarly, a Web publisher 
cannot modify the content of its site so as to restrict 
different geographic communities to access of only certain 
portions of their site. Thus, once published on the Web, 
existing technology does not permit the published material 
to be restricted to particular states or jurisdictions. 
 
D. Procedural History 
 
On October 22, 1998, the day after COPA was enacted, 
the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") brought the 
present action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, challenging COPA's 
constitutionality and seeking to enjoin its enforcement.13 
After granting a temporary restraining order against 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. People v. Barrows, 177 Misc. 2d 712, 729 (NY 1998) 
 
13. Other parties joined the ACLU in asserting the unconstitutionality of 
COPA. For ease of reference, we will refer to all party-plaintiffs as 
"ACLU" 
throughout this opinion. 
 
                                13 
  
enforcement of the law on November 20, 1998, the District 
Court held extensive evidentiary hearings which, on 
February 1, 1999, resulted in the entry of a preliminary 
injunction preventing the government from enforcing COPA. 
 
E. District Court's Findings of Fact 
 
After five days of testimony, the District Court rendered 
sixty-seven separate findings of fact concerning the 
Internet, the Web, and COPA's impact on speech activity in 
this relatively-new medium. See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 
482-92. It bears noting that none of the parties dispute the 
District Court's findings (including those describing the 
Internet and the Web), nor are any challenged as clearly 
erroneous. Thus, we accept these findings. 
 
The District Court first rendered findings concerning the 
physical medium known as the Internet, which it 
recognized consisted of many different methods of 
communication, only one of which is the World Wide Web. 
See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 482-83. It found that "[o]nce 
a provider posts its content on the Internet and chooses to 
make it available to all, it generally cannot prevent that 
content from entering any geographical community." Id. 
 
The Court then made findings as to the costs and 
burdens COPA imposes on Web publishers and on the 
adults who seek access to sites covered by COPA. See Reno 
III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 482-492. As observed earlier, the 
statute provides for a limited number of defenses for Web 
publishers. See 47 U.S.C. S 231(c). 14 The Court found that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The statute provides: 
 
       It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that 
       the defendant, in good faith, has restricted access by minors to 
       material that is harmful to minors -- 
 
       (A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit accou nt, adult access 
       code, or adult personal identification number, 
 
       (B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or 
 
       (C) by any other reasonable measures that are feas ible under 
       available technology. 
 
See 47 U.S.C. S 231(c). 
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as a technological matter the only affirmative defenses 
presently available are the implementation of credit card or 
age verification systems because there is no currently 
functional digital certificate or other reasonable means to 
verify age. See Reno III. 31 F. Supp. 2d at 487. 
 
With respect to the credit card option, the court found 
that the cost to Web publishers could range from $300 to 
"thousands of dollars" (exclusive of transaction fees 
incurred from each verification). Id. at 488. These costs 
were also exclusive, according to the court, of the labor and 
energy that would be required of the Web publisher to 
implement such a system. Id. This labor and energy would 
include reorganizing a particular Web site to ensure that 
material considered "harmful to minors" could only be 
accessed after passing through a credit card or other age 
verification system. See id. at 490. With this in mind, the 
court found, for example, that textual material that 
consisted primarily of non-sexual material, but also 
included some content that was "harmful to minors" would 
also be subject to such age verification systems. See id. 
 
As for age verification systems, the District Court's 
findings were more optimistic. The court found that a Web 
publisher "can sign up for free with Adult Check[one 
company providing such a service] to accept Adult Check 
PINs, and a Web site operator can earn commissions of up 
to 50% to 60% of the fees generated by [their] users." Id. at 
489. The District Court also downplayed the cost (both in 
price and in energy) that would be incurred by the 
individual seeking to access "harmful to minors" material 
on the Web, finding that an Adult Check password could be 
easily purchased for only $16.95. See id. at 490.15 The 
same burdens concerning the reorganization of a particular 
Web site mentioned above would, of course, equally apply 
to a Web publisher that elected to utilize a PIN number for 
age verification. 
 
Either system, according to the District Court, would 
impose significant residual or indirect burdens upon Web 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. It now seems that those with a valid credit card who wish to acquire 
an adult PIN may do so without cost using a Web service such as 
www.freecheck.com. 
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publishers. Most importantly, both credit card and age 
verification systems require an individual seeking to access 
material otherwise permissible to adults to reveal personal 
statistics. Because many adults will choose not to reveal 
these personal details, those otherwise frequently visited 
Web sites will experience "a loss of traffic." Id. at 491. This 
loss of traffic, in turn, would inflict "economic harm" upon 
the particular Web site, thus increasing the burden that 
COPA imposes. Id. P 61. 
 
Finally, the District Court considered whether voluntary 
parental blocking or filtering software was a less restrictive 
means by which to achieve the government's compelling 
objective of protecting minors from harmful material on the 
Web. The court found that "[s]uch technology may be 
downloaded and installed on a user's home computer at a 
price of approximately $40.00." Id. at 492 P 65. The court, 
however, acknowledged that such software "is not perfect" 
as it is both over and under inclusive in the breadth of the 
material that it blocks and filters. See id.  P 66.16 
 
F. District Court's Conclusions of Law 
 
Initially, the government moved the District Court to 
dismiss the ACLU's action insofar as the individuals and 
entities that it purported to represent were not in danger of 
prosecution under COPA and therefore lacked standing. In 
particular, the government asserted that the material 
placed on plaintiffs' Web sites was not "harmful to minors" 
and that each of the plaintiffs were not "engaged in the 
business" of posting such material for "commercial 
purposes." See supra note 13. 
 
The District Court interpreted COPA to impose liability on 
those Web publishers who profited from Web sites that 
contained some, even though not all, material that was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. We question, however, the effectiveness of actions taken by a minor's 
parent to supervise or block harmful material by using filtering software. 
We are of the view that such actions do not constitute government 
action, and we do not consider this to be a lesser restrictive means for 
the government to achieve its compelling interest. See also n.24 supra. 
But see United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 2000 WL 
646196 (U.S. May 22, 2000). 
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harmful to minors. See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 480. The 
court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs could 
reasonably fear prosecution because their Web sites 
 
contained material "that is sexual in nature." Id. 
 
Having established plaintiffs' standing17  -- an analysis 
with which we agree -- the District Court began its First 
Amendment analysis by stating that insofar as COPA 
prohibits Web publishers from posting material that is 
"harmful to minors," it constitutes a content-based 
restriction on speech that "is presumptively invalid and is 
subject to strict scrutiny." Id. at 493 (citing R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992); Sable Comm. of Calif. v. 
FCC, 492 U.S. 115,126 (1989)) See also United States v. 
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 2000 WL 646196 (U.S. 
May 22, 2000). Pursuant to this strict scrutiny analysis, 
the District Court held that COPA placed too large a burden 
on protected expression. In particular, the court found that 
the high economic costs that Web publishers would incur 
in implementing an age verification system would cause 
them to cease publishing such material, and further, that 
the difficulty in accurately shielding harmful material from 
minors would lead Web publishers to censor more material 
than necessary. See id. at 494-95. Moreover, the District 
Court believed that because of the need to use age 
verification systems, adults would be deterred from 
accessing these sites, and that the resulting loss of Web 
traffic would affect the Web publishers' abilities to continue 
providing such communications in the future. 
 
The court then considered whether the government could 
establish that COPA was the least restrictive and most 
narrowly tailored means to achieve its compelling objective. 
See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 496. The government 
contends that COPA meets this test because COPA does not 
" `ban . . . the distribution or display of material harmful to 
minors [but] simply requires the sellers of such material to 
recast their message so that they are not readily available 
to children.' " Appellant's Brief at 27 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
105-775 at 6 (1998)). The court concluded, however, that 
even if COPA were enforced, children would still be able to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 479. 
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access numerous foreign Web sites containing harmful 
material; that some minors legitimately possess credit cards 
-- thus defeating the effectiveness of this affirmative 
defense in restricting access by minors; that COPA 
prohibits a "sweeping category of form of content" instead of 
limiting its coverage to pictures, images and graphic image 
files -- most often utilized by the adult industry as 
"teasers" Reno III 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497; and that parental 
blocking and filtering technology would likely be as effective 
as COPA while imposing fewer constitutional burdens on 
free speech. Therefore, the District Court concluded that 
COPA was not the least restrictive means for the 
government to achieve its compelling objective of protecting 
minors from harmful material. Id. at 492. As a result, the 
court held that the ACLU had shown a substantial 
likelihood of succeeding on the merits in establishing 
COPA's unconstitutionality. 
 
In concluding its analysis, the District Court held that 
losing First Amendment freedoms, even if only for a 
moment, constitutes irreparable harm. See id.  (citing Hohe 
v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72-73 (3d Cir. 1989)). And, in 
balancing the interests at stake for issuing a preliminary 
injunction, the District Court concluded that the scale 
tipped in favor of the ACLU, as the government lacks an 
interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law. See id. (citing 
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). 
Because the ACLU met its burden for a preliminary 
injunction, the District Court granted its petition. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
In determining whether a preliminary injunction is 
warranted, we must consider: 
 
       (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable 
       probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the 
       movant will be irreparably harmed by denial of the 
       relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result 
       in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) 
       whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the 
       public interest. 
 
                                18 
  
Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (citing ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of 
Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)). We 
review a district court's grant of a preliminary injunction 
according to a three-part standard. Legal conclusions are 
reviewed de novo, findings of fact are reviewed for clear 
error, and the "ultimate decision to grant or deny the 
preliminary injunction" is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 183 (3d Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1802 (1999). 
 
A. Reasonable probability of success on the merits 
 
We begin our analysis by considering what, for this case, 
is the most significant prong of the preliminary injunction 
test -- whether the ACLU met its burden of establishing a 
reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits in 
proving that COPA trenches upon the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. Initially, we note that the 
District Court correctly determined that as a content-based 
restriction on speech, COPA is "both presumptively invalid 
and subject to strict scrutiny analysis." See Reno III, 31 F. 
Supp. 2d at 493. As in all areas of constitutional strict 
scrutiny jurisprudence, the government must establish that 
the challenged statute is narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling state interest, and that it seeks to protect its 
interest in a manner that is the least restrictive of protected 
speech. See, e.g., Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980); Sable Comm of 
Calif. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,126 (1989).18 These principles 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The Supreme Court has recognized that each medium of expression 
may permit special justifications for regulation. See Southeastern 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975); Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). For example, broadcast media, due to 
the history of extensive government regulation, its"invasive" nature, and 
the scarcity of available frequencies at its inception justified 
heightened 
regulation. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 637-38 (1994); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 
115, 128 (1989). See also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 
Inc., 2000 WL 646196 (U.S. May 22, 2000). However, the Supreme Court 
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have been emphasized again in the Supreme Court's most 
recent opinion, United States v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group, Inc., 2000 WL 646196 (U.S. May 22, 2000), where 
the Court, concerned with the "bleeding" of cable 
transmissions, held S 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment. 
 
It is undisputed that the government has a compelling 
interest in protecting children from material that is harmful 
to them, even if not obscene by adult standards. See Reno 
III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 
(1989); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 
(1968)). At issue is whether, in achieving this compelling 
objective, Congress has articulated a constitutionally 
permissible means to achieve its objective without 
curtailing the protected free speech rights of adults. See 
Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 
127; Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). As we 
have observed, the District Court found that it had not -- 
holding that COPA was not likely to succeed in surviving 
strict scrutiny analysis. 
 
We base our particular determination of COPA's likely 
unconstitutionality, however, on COPA's reliance on 
"contemporary community standards" in the context of the 
electronic medium of the Web to identify material that is 
harmful to minors. The overbreadth of COPA's definition of 
"harmful to minors" applying a "contemporary community 
standards" clause -- although virtually ignored by the 
parties and the amicus in their respective briefs but raised 
by us at oral argument -- so concerns us that we are 
persuaded that this aspect of COPA, without reference to its 
other provisions, must lead inexorably to a holding of a 
likelihood of unconstitutionality of the entire COPA statute. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
has also recognized that these same elements, which justified heightened 
regulation of the broadcast medium, do not exist in cyberspace. See 
ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). The Internet has not been 
historically subject to regulation. Nor has the Internet suffered from a 
scarcity of available frequencies. See id. at 869-70. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court held that there is "no basis for qualifying the level of 
First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this [cyberspace] 
medium." Id. at 870. 
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Hence we base our opinion entirely on the basis of the 
likely unconstitutionality of this clause, even though the 
District Court relied on numerous other grounds. 19 
 
As previously noted, in passing COPA, Congress 
attempted to resolve all of the problems raised by the 
Supreme Court in striking down the CDA as 
unconstitutional. One concern noted by the Supreme Court 
was that, as a part of the wholly unprecedented broad 
coverage of the CDA, "the `community standards' criterion 
as applied to the Internet means that any communication 
available to a nationwide audience will be judged by the 
standards of the community most likely to be offended by 
the message." Reno II, 521 U.S. at 877-78. We are not 
persuaded that the Supreme Court's concern with respect 
to the "community standards" criterion has been 
sufficiently remedied by Congress in COPA. 
 
Previously, in addressing the mailing of unsolicited 
sexually explicit material in violation of a California 
obscenity statute, the Supreme Court held that the fact- 
finder must determine whether " `the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards' wouldfind 
the work taken as a whole, [to appeal] to the prurient 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. As a result, we do not find it necessary to address the District 
Court's analysis of the definition of "commercial purposes"; whether the 
breadth of the forms of content covered by COPA could have been more 
narrowly tailored; whether the affirmative defenses impose too great a 
burden on Web publishers or whether those affirmative defenses should 
have been included as elements of the crime itself; whether COPA's 
inclusion of criminal as well as civil penalties was excessive; whether 
COPA is designed to include communications made in chat rooms, 
discussion groups and links to other Web sites; whether the government 
is entitled to so restrict communications when children will continue to 
be able to access foreign Web sites and other sources of material that is 
harmful to them; what taken "as a whole" should mean in the context of 
the Web and the Internet; or whether the statute's failure to distinguish 
between material that is harmful to a six year old versus a sixteen year 
old is problematic. 
 
We recognize that in focusing on the "contemporary community 
standards" aspect of COPA we are affirming the District Court's ruling on 
a ground other than that emphasized by the District Court. See Paac v. 
Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306, 308 n.1 (1974). 
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interest." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) 
(quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)). In 
response to the Supreme Court's criticism of the CDA, 
Congress incorporated into COPA this Miller test, explaining 
that in so doing COPA now "conforms to the standards 
identified in Ginsberg, as modified by the Supreme Court in 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)." H.R. REP. NO. 105- 
775 at 13 (1998); 47 U.S.C. S 231(e)(6)(A). Even in so doing, 
Congress remained cognizant of the fact that "the 
application of community standards in the context of the 
Web is controversial." H.R. REP. N O. 107-775, at 28. 
Nevertheless, in defending the constitutionality of COPA's 
use of the Miller test, the government insists that "there is 
nothing dispositive about the fact that [in COPA] 
commercial distribution of such [harmful] materials occurs 
through an online, rather than a brick and mortar outlet." 
See Reply Brief at 18 n.3. 
 
Despite the government's assertion, "[e]ach medium of 
expression `must be assessed for First Amendment 
purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its 
own problems.' " Reno III, 31 F. Supp.2d at 495 (quoting 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 
(1975)). See also United States v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group, Inc., 2000 WL 646196, at *8 (U.S. May 22, 2000). In 
considering "the unique factors that affect communication 
in the new and technology-laden medium of the Web," we 
are convinced that there are crucial differences between a 
"brick and mortar outlet" and the online Web that 
dramatically affect a First Amendment analysis. Id 
 
Unlike a "brick and mortar outlet" with a specific 
geographic locale, and unlike the voluntary physical mailing 
of material from one geographic location to another, as in 
Miller, the uncontroverted facts indicate that the Web is not 
geographically constrained. See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 
482-92; American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 169 
("geography, however, is a virtually meaningless construct 
on the Internet"). Indeed, and of extreme significance, is the 
fact, as found by the District Court, that Web publishers 
are without any means to limit access to their sites based 
on the geographic location of particular Internet users. As 
soon as information is published on a Web site, it is 
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accessible to all other Web visitors. See American Libraries, 
969 F. Supp. at 166; Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 483. 
Current technology prevents Web publishers from 
circumventing particular jurisdictions or limiting their site's 
content "from entering any [specific] geographic 
community." Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484. This key 
difference necessarily affects our analysis in attempting to 
define what contemporary community standards should or 
could mean in a medium without geographic boundaries. 
 
In expressing its concern over the wholly unprecedented 
broad coverage of the CDA's scope, the Supreme Court has 
already noted that because of the peculiar geography-free 
nature of cyberspace, a "community standards" test would 
essentially require every Web communication to abide by 
the most restrictive community's standards. See Reno II, 
521 U.S. at 877-78. Similarly, to avoid liability under 
COPA, affected Web publishers would either need to 
severely censor their publications or implement an age or 
credit card verification system whereby any material that 
might be deemed harmful by the most puritan of 
communities in any state is shielded behind such a 
verification system. Shielding such vast amounts of 
material behind verification systems would prevent access 
to protected material by any adult seventeen or over 
without the necessary age verification credentials. 
Moreover, it would completely bar access to those materials 
to all minors under seventeen -- even if the material would 
not otherwise have been deemed "harmful" to them in their 
respective geographic communities. 
 
The government argues that subjecting Web publishers to 
varying community standards is not constitutionally 
problematic or, for that matter, unusual. The government 
notes that there are numerous cases in which the courts 
have already subjected the same conduct to varying 
community standards, depending on the community in 
which the conduct occurred. For example, the Supreme 
Court has stated that "distributors of allegedly obscene 
materials may be subjected to varying community 
standards in the various federal judicial districts into which 
they transmit the material [but that] does not render a 
federal statute unconstitutional because of the failure of the 
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application of uniform national standards of obscenity." 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974). 
Similarly, the government cites to the "dial-a-porn" cases in 
which the Supreme Court has held that even if the 
"audience is comprised of different communities with 
different local standards" the company providing the 
obscene material "ultimately bears the burden of complying 
with the prohibition on obscene messages" under each 
community's respective standard. Sable Comm. of California 
v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1989). 
 
These cases, however, are easily distinguished from the 
present case. In each of those cases, the defendants had 
the ability to control the distribution of controversial 
material with respect to the geographic communities into 
which they released it. Therefore, the defendants could limit 
their exposure to liability by avoiding those communities 
with particularly restrictive standards, while continuing to 
provide the controversial material in more liberal-minded 
communities. For example, the pornographer in Hamling 
could have chosen not to mail unsolicited sexually explicit 
material to certain communities while continuing to mail 
them to others. Similarly, the telephone pornographers 
("dial-a-porn") in Sable could have screened their incoming 
calls and then only accepted a call if its point of origination 
was from a community with standards of decency that were 
not offended by the content of their pornographic telephone 
messages.20 
 
By contrast, Web publishers have no such comparable 
control. Web publishers cannot restrict access to their site 
based on the geographic locale of the Internet user visiting 
their site. In fact, "an Internet user cannot foreclose access 
to . . . work from certain states or send differing versions of 
. . . communication[s] to different jurisdictions . . . The 
Internet user has no ability to bypass any particular state." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. The Sable court found that: "Sable is free to tailor its messages, on 
a selective basis, if it so chooses, to the communities it chooses to 
serve. 
While Sable may be forced to incur some costs in developing and 
implementing a system for screening the locale of incoming calls, there 
is no constitutional impediment to enacting a law that may imposes 
such costs on a medium electing to provide these messages." Sable 492 
U.S. at 125-26. 
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American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). As a result, unlike telephone or postal mail 
pornographers, Web publishers of material that may be 
harmful to minors must "comply with the regulation 
imposed by the State with the most stringent standard or 
[entirely] forego Internet communication of the message 
that might or might not subject [the publisher] to 
prosecution." Id. 
 
To minimize this distinction between Web publishers and 
all other forms of communication that contain material that 
is harmful to minors, the government cites to one Sixth 
Circuit case -- presently the only case in which a court has 
applied a "community standards" test in the context of the 
electronic medium. See United States v. Thomas , 74 F.3d 
701 (6th Cir. 1996). The Thomas court determined that 
whether the material on the defendant's electronic bulletin 
board is harmful must be judged by the standards of each 
individual community wherein the disputed material was 
received, even if the standards in each of the recipient 
communities varied one from the next, and even if the 
material was acceptable in the community from which it 
was sent. See id at 711. Despite the "electronic medium" in 
which electronic bulletin boards are found, Thomas is 
inapposite inasmuch as electronic bulletin boards, just as 
telephones, regular mail and other brick and mortar 
outlets, are very different creatures from that of the Web as 
a whole. Thomas itself recognized this difference, and by 
limiting its holding accordingly, completely undercuts the 
government's argument, stating explicitly that: 
 
       Defendants and Amicus Curiae appearing on their 
       behalf argue that the computer technology used here 
       requires a new definition of community, i.e., one that is 
       based on the broad-ranging connections among people 
       in cyberspace rather than the geographic locale of the 
       federal judicial district of the criminal trial. . .. 
       Therefore, they contend . . . [bulletin board publishers] 
       will be forced to censor their material so as not to run 
       afoul of the standards of the community with the most 
       restrictive standards. Defendants' First Amendment 
       issue, however, is not implicated by the facts of this 
       case. This is not a situation where the bulletin board 
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       operator had no knowledge or control over the 
       jurisdictions where materials were distributed for 
       downloading or printing. Access to the Defendants' 
       [bulletin board] was limited. Membership was 
       necessary and applications were submitted and 
       screened before passwords were issued and materials 
       were distributed. Thus, Defendants had in place 
       methods to limit user access in jurisdictions where the 
       risk of a finding of obscenity was greater than in 
       California . . . . If Defendants did not wish to subject 
       themselves to liability in jurisdictions with less tolerant 
       standards for determining obscenity, they could have 
       refused to give passwords to members in those 
       districts, thus precluding the risk of liability. . . . . 
       Thus, under the facts of this case, there is not need for 
       this court to adopt a new definition of "community' for 
       use in obscenity prosecutions involving electronic 
       bulletin boards. This court's decision is guided by one 
       of the cardinal rules governing the federal courts, i.e., 
       never reach constitutional questions not squarely 
       presented by the facts of a case." Id. at 711-12. 
 
Thus, it is clear that Thomas fails to support the 
government's position. Indeed, no federal court has yet 
ruled on whether the Web/Internet may be constitutionally 
regulated in light of differing community standards. 
 
Our concern with COPA's adoption of Miller's 
"contemporary community standards" test by which to 
determine whether material is harmful to minors is with 
respect to its overbreadth in the context of the Web 
medium. Because no technology currently exists by which 
Web publishers may avoid liability, such publishers would 
necessarily be compelled to abide by the "standards of the 
community most likely to be offended by the message" Reno 
II, 521 U.S. at 877-78, even if the same material would not 
have been deemed harmful to minors in all other 
communities. Moreover, by restricting their publications to 
meet the more stringent standards of less liberal 
communities, adults whose constitutional rights permit 
them to view such materials would be unconstitutionally 
deprived of those rights. Thus, this result imposes an 
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overreaching burden and restriction on constitutionally 
protected speech.21 
 
We recognize that invalidating a statute because it is 
overbroad is "strong medicine." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 613 (1972). As such, before concluding that a 
statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, we seek to 
determine if the statute is " `readily susceptible' to a 
narrowing construction that would make it constitutional 
. . . [because courts] will not rewrite a . . . law to conform 
it to constitutional requirements." Virginia v. American 
Booksellers' Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (quoting 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)). See 
also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; Forsyth County v. 
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992); Shea, 930 
F. Supp. at 939. 
 
Two possible ways to limit the interpretation of COPA are 
(a) assigning a narrow meaning to the language of the 
statute itself, or (b) deleting that portion of the statute that 
is unconstitutional, while preserving the remainder of the 
statute intact. See e.g. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 
472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985); Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 939. We 
therefore turn our attention to whether either limiting 
construction is feasible here. 
 
The government, in attempting to make use of thefirst of 
these salvaging mechanisms, suggests that we should 
interpret narrowly the "contemporary community 
standards" language in COPA as an "adult" rather than as 
a "geographic" standard. The House Report itself suggests 
this construction to sidestep the potential constitutional 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Even if we were to overlook the unconstitutional overbreadth of the 
COPA "contemporary community standards" test and if COPA were to be 
deemed effective, it still would not eliminate much of the harmful 
material which a minor could access. For example, minors could still 
access harmful material published by non-commercial Web publishers, 
and by foreign Web publishers. Thus, for example, materials "harmful to 
minors" but generated in foreign communities with contemporary 
community standards far more liberal than those of any state in the 
United States may, nevertheless, remain available and be exposed to 
children in the United States by means of the Web/Internet, despite 
COPA's restrictions. 
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problems raised by the Supreme Court in interpreting the 
CDA's use of a "community standards" phrase. Congress 
explained: 
 
       "The committee intends for the definition of material 
       harmful to minors to parallel the Ginsberg and Miller 
       definitions of obscenity and harmful to minors. . . . In 
       essence, the Committee intends to adopt the `variable 
       obscenity' standard for minors. The Committee 
       recognizes that the applicability of community 
       standards in the context of the Web is controversial, 
       but understands it as an `adult' standard, rather than 
       a `geographic' standard, and one that is reasonably 
       constant among adults in America with respect to what 
       is suitable for minors." . . . . Thus, the person posting 
       the material is engaged in interstate commerce and is 
       subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of all 
       communities in a manner similar to the way obscenity 
       laws apply today." 
 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-775 at 28 (1998). Congress reiterated 
this very position in its amicus brief stating:"COPA adopted 
a non-geographic, adult age community standard for 
judging the prurience and offensiveness prongs of the 
Harmful to Minors test." Brief of Members of Congress as 
Amici Curiae, at 16. 
 
Despite the government's effort to salvage this clause of 
COPA from unconstitutionality, we have before us no 
evidence to suggest that adults everywhere in America 
would share the same standards for determining what is 
harmful to minors. To the contrary, it is significant to us 
that throughout case law, community standards have 
always been interpreted as a geographic standard without 
uniformity. See, e.g., American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 
969 F. Supp. 160, 182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Courts have 
long recognized, however, that there is no single`prevailing 
community standard' in the United States. Thus, even were 
all 50 states to enact laws that were verbatim copies of the 
New York [obscenity] Act, Internet users would still be 
subject to discordant responsibilities."). 
 
In fact, Miller, the very case from which the government 
derives its "community standards" concept, has made clear 
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that community standards are to be construed in a 
localized geographic context. "People in different States vary 
in their tastes and attitudes and this diversity is not to be 
strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity." Miller 
413 U.S. at 33. Even more directly, the Supreme Court 
stated in Miller that "our nation is simply too big and too 
diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such 
standards [of what is patently offensive] could be 
articulated for all 50 states in a single formulation. . . . To 
require a State to structure obscenity proceedings around 
evidence of a national `community standard' would be an 
exercise in futility." Id. at 30 . We therefore conclude that 
the interpretation of "contemporary community standards" 
is not "readily susceptible" to a narrowing construction of 
"adult" rather than "geographic" standard. 
 
With respect to the second salvaging mechanism, it is an 
" `elementary principle that the same statute may be in part 
constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and that if the 
parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is 
constitutional may stand while that which is 
unconstitutional will be rejected' " Brockett v. Spokane 
Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985) (quoting Allen v. 
Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 83-84 (1881)). As a result, if it is 
possible for a court to identify a particular part of the 
statute that is unconstitutional, and by striking only that 
language the court could leave the remainder of the statute 
intact and within the intent of Congress, courts should do 
so. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684-85 
(1987). 
 
Here, however, striking "contemporary community 
standards" from COPA is not likely to succeed in salvaging 
COPA's constitutionality as this standard is an integral part 
of the statute, permeating and influencing the whole of the 
statute. We see no means by which to excise those 
"unconstitutional" elements of the statute from those that 
are constitutional (assuming for the moment, without 
deciding, that the remaining clauses of COPA are held to be 
constitutional). This is particularly so in a preliminary 
injunction context when we are convinced that the very test 
or standard that COPA has established to determine what 
is harmful to minors is more likely than not to be held 
unconstitutional. See Brockett, 472 U.S. at 504-05. 
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Our foregoing discussion that under either approach-- of 
narrowing construction or deleting an unconstitutional 
element -- COPA is not "readily susceptible" to a 
construction that would make it constitutional. We agree 
with the Second Circuit that "[t]he State may not regulate 
at all if it turns out that even the least restrictive means of 
regulation is still unreasonable when its limitations on 
freedom of speech are balanced against the benefits gained 
from those limitations." Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 
837 F.2d 546, 555 (2d Cir. 1988). As regulation under 
existing technology is unreasonable here, we conclude that 
with respect to this first prong of our preliminary injunction 
analysis, it is more likely than not that COPA will be found 
unconstitutional on the merits.22 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Although our concern here has been with the overbreadth of the 
"contemporary community standards" clause, we recognize that if we 
were to address that portion of COPA which speaks to communications 
made for commercial purposes, 47 U.S.C. S 231(e)(2)(A), the Supreme 
Court has taught that "[f]or the purposes of applying the overbreadth 
doctrine . . . it remains relevant to distinguish between commercial and 
noncommercial speech." Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 n.7 (1980). For instance, it has declined 
to apply the overbreadth doctrine to statutes regulating commercial 
advertising: 
 
       [T]he justification for the application of overbreadth analysis 
applies 
       weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context . . . [T]here 
are 
       `commonsense differences' between commercial speech and other 
       varieties. Since advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it 
       seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to 
being 
       crushed by overbroad regulation. Moreover, concerns for uncertainty 
       in determining the scope of protection are reduced .. . 
 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977) (citations 
omitted). See also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. 
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980) ("[C]ommercial 
speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of 
expression that is not `particularly susceptible to being crushed by 
overbroad regulation.' "). 
 
However, although COPA regulates the commercial content of the Web, 
it amounts to neither a restriction on commercial advertising, nor a 
regulation of activity occurring "in the ordinary commercial context." 
Bates, 433 U.S. at 380-81. As we have noted, the Web is a new type of 
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Our holding in no way ignores or questions the general 
applicability of the holding in Miller with respect to 
"contemporary community standards." We remain satisfied 
that Miller's "community standards" test continues to be a 
useful and viable tool in contexts other than  the Internet 
and the Web under present technology. Miller itself was 
designed to address the mailing of unsolicited sexually 
explicit material in violation of California law, where a 
publisher could control the community receiving the 
publication. Miller, however, has no applicability to the 
Internet and the Web, where Web publishers are currently 
without the ability to control the geographic scope of the 
recipients of their communications. See Reno II , 521 U.S. at 
889 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (noting that the "twin characteristics of 
geography and identity" differentiate the world of Ginsberg 
[and Miller] from that of the Internet.). 
 
B. Irreparable Harm By Denial of Relief 
 
The second prong of our preliminary injunction analysis 
requires us to consider "whether the movant will be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
medium which allows the average person with relatively little capital 
investment to place content on it for a commercial purpose. The speech 
such Web sites provide is in far greater danger of being stifled by 
government regulation than the commercial advertising at issue in cases 
such as Bates and Central Hudson Gas. 
 
As the Supreme Court has also made clear, the benefits gained by the 
challenged statute must also outweigh the burden imposed on 
commercial speech. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976); 
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 
188 (1999) (in regulating commercial speech, "the regulation may not be 
sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the 
government's purpose."). The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that 
the free speech rights of adults may not be reduced to allow them to 
read only what is acceptable for children. See Bolger v. Young Drug Prods 
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983) ("The level of discourse reaching a 
mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a 
sandbox."). See also Sable, 492 U.S. at 127. Therefore, there is no 
inconsistency between our position that COPA is overbroad, and the line 
of authority refusing to apply overbreadth analysis to certain types of 
commercial speech. 
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irreparably harmed by denial of the relief." Allegheny 
Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc. 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Generally, "[i]n a First Amendment challenge, a plaintiff 
who meets the first prong of the test for a preliminary 
injunction will almost certainly meet the second, since 
irreparable injury normally arises out of the deprivation of 
speech rights." Reno I, 929 F. Supp. 824 at 866. This case 
is no exception. 
 
If a preliminary injunction were not to issue, COPA- 
affected Web publishers would most assuredly suffer 
irreparable harm -- the curtailment of their constitutionally 
protected right to free speech. As the Supreme Court has 
clearly stated, "the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for 
even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes 
irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 
(1976). We, therefore, conclude that this element of our 
preliminary injunction analysis has been satisfied. 
 
C. Injury Outweighs Harm 
 
The third prong of our preliminary injunction analysis 
requires us to consider "whether granting preliminary relief 
will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party." 
Allegeny Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). 
We are convinced that in balancing the parties' respective 
interests, COPA's threatened constraint on constitutionally 
protected free speech far outweighs the damage that would 
be imposed by our failure to affirm this preliminary 
injunction. We are also aware that without a preliminary 
injunction, Web publishers subject to COPA would 
immediately be required to censor constitutionally protected 
speech for adults, or incur substantial financial costs to 
implement COPA's affirmative defenses.23  Therefore, we 
affirm the District Court's holding that plaintiffs sufficiently 
met their burden in establishing this third prong of the 
preliminary injunction analysis. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. These costs with respect to Web publishers and to those who desire 
access to those Web sites were enumerated by the District Court in its 
findings of fact. 
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D. Public Interest 
 
As the fourth and final element of our preliminary 
injunction analysis, we consider "whether granting the 
preliminary relief will be in the public interest." Allegeny 
Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Curtailing constitutionally protected speech will not 
advance the public interest, and "neither the Government 
nor the public generally can claim an interest in the 
enforcement of an unconstitutional law." Reno I, 929 F. 
Supp. at 866. Having met this final element of our 
preliminary injunction analysis, the District Court properly 
granted the ACLU's petition for a preliminary injunction. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
Due to current technological limitations, COPA -- 
Congress' laudatory attempt to achieve its compelling 
objective of protecting minors from harmful material on the 
World Wide Web -- is more likely than not to be found 
unconstitutional as overbroad on the merits.24 Because the 
ACLU has met its burden in establishing all four of the 
necessary elements to obtain a preliminary injunction, and 
the District Court properly exercised its discretion in 
issuing the preliminary injunction, we will affirm the 
District Court's order. 
 
In so affirming, we approvingly reiterate the sentiments 
aptly noted by the District Court: "sometimes we must 
make decisions that we do not like. We make them because 
they are right, right in the sense that the law and the 
Constitution, as we see them, compel the result." Reno III, 
31 F. Supp. 2d at 498.25 We also express our confidence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Although much attention at the District Court level was focused on 
the availability, virtues and effectiveness of voluntary blocking or 
filtering 
software that can enable parents to limit the harmful material to which 
their children may otherwise be exposed, the parental hand should not 
be looked to as a substitute for a congressional mandate. See also n.16 
supra. 
25. "When sensitive matters of freedom of speech collide with images of 
children's vulnerability, and are framed in terms of the battle between 
good and evil, even well intentioned people can lose sight of fundamental 
constitutional principles." Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining 
the State's Interest in Protecting Children from Controversial Speech, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 427, 521 (2000). 
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and firm conviction that developing technology will soon 
render the "community standards" challenge moot, thereby 
making congressional regulation to protect minors from 
harmful material on the Web constitutionally practicable. 
Indeed, in the context of dealing with technology to prevent 
the "bleeding" of cable transmissions, the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 2000 
WL 646196 at *4 (U.S. May 22, 2000) recognized, as do we, 
that "technology may one day provide another solution." 
 
Therefore, we will affirm the District Court's order dated 
February 1, 1999, issuing a preliminary injunction. 
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